MIT 6.875

Foundations of Cryptography
Lecture 14

Beyond Secure Communication



Much more than communicating securely.

- Complex Interactions: proofs, computations, games.
- Complex Adversaries: Alice or Bob, adaptively chosen.
- Complex Properties: Correctness, Privacy, Fairness.
- Many Parties: this class, MIT, the internet.

Classical Proofs




Steve Cook


Leonid Levin

Prover writes down a string (proof); Verifier checks.





Proofs



Efficiently Verifiable Proofs: $\mathcal{NP}$



Works hard

Polynomial-time

Theorem: N is a product of two prime numbers

Prover

Proof $= (\boldsymbol{P}, \boldsymbol{Q})$

Verifier

Accept *iff* $\mathrm{N} = PQ \; and \; P, Q \; prime$

Efficiently Verifiable Proofs: $\mathcal{NP}$



Works hard

Polynomial-time

Def: A language/decision procedure $\mathcal{L}$ is simply a set of strings. So, $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$.

Efficiently Verifiable Proofs: $\mathcal{NP}$



Def: $\mathcal{L}$ is an $\mathcal{NP}$-language if there is a **poly-time** verifier V where

- **Completeness**: **True theorems have (short) proofs.**

  for all x $\in \mathcal{L}$, there is a **poly(|x|)-long** witness (proof) w $\in \{0,1\}^*$ s.t. $V(x,w) = 1$.

- **Soundness: False theorems have no short proofs.**

  for all x $\notin \mathcal{L}$, there is no witness. That is, for all polynomially long w $\in \{0,1\}^*$, $V(x,w) = 0$.

Theorem: N is a product of two prime numbers

Prover

Proof $= (\boldsymbol{P}, \boldsymbol{Q})$

Verifier

Accept *iff* $\mathrm{N} = PQ$.

After interaction, Bob the Verifier knows:

1) N is a product of two primes.

2) **Also**, the two factors of N.

Theorem: y is a quadratic residue mod N

Prover

Proof $= x \in Z_N^*$

Verifier

Accept *iff*
$y = x^2 \pmod{N}$.

After interaction, Bob the Verifier knows:

1) y is a quadratic residue mod N.

2) **Also**, the square root of y.

Theorem: Graphs G_0 and G_1 are isomorphic.





Prover

Proof $= \pi: [N] \to [N]$,

the isomorphism

Verifier

Check $\forall i, j$:

$\big(\pi(i), \pi(j)\big) \in E_1$ iff $(i, j) \in E_0$.

Theorem: Graphs G_0 and G_1 are isomorphic.





Prover

Proof $= \pi: [N] \rightarrow [N]$,

the isomorphism

Verifier

After interaction, Bob the Verifier knows:

1) G_0 and G_1 are isomorphic.

2) **Also**, the isomorphism.

Theorem: Graphs G has a Hamiltonian cycle.



Prover

Proof = Hamiltonian cycle

$$(v_0, \ldots, v_{N-1})$$

Verifier

Check $\forall i$:

$$(v_i, v_{i+1 \bmod N}) \in E$$

Theorem: Graphs G has a Hamiltonian cycle.



Prover

Proof = Hamiltonian cycle

$$(v_0, \ldots, v_{N-1})$$

Verifier

After interaction, Bob the Verifier knows:

1) G ***has*** a Hamiltonian cycle.

2) **Also**, the Hamiltonian cycle itself.

Theorem: Graphs G has a Hamiltonian cycle.



Prover

Proof = Hamiltonian cycle

$$(v_0, \ldots, v_{N-1})$$

Verifier

NP-Complete Problem:

Every one of the other problems can be reduced to it

Theorem: y is a quadratic residue mod N

Prover

Proof $= x \in Z_N^*$

Verifier

Accept *iff*
$y = x^2 \pmod{N}$.

After interaction, Bob the Verifier knows:

1) y is a quadratic residue mod N.

2) **Also**, the square root of y.

Is there any other way?

Zero Knowledge Proofs

Prover

"I will prove to you that I could've sent you a proof if I felt like it."

Micali Goldwasser Rackoff

Zero Knowledge Proofs



Prover

"I will not give you the square root, but I will prove to you that I could provide one if I wanted to."

Micali Goldwasser Rackoff

Two (Necessary) New Ingredients

1. Interaction: Rather than passively reading the proof, the verifier engages in a conversation with the prover.

2. Randomness: The verifier is randomized and can make a mistake with a (exponentially small) probability.



Here is the idea.

Prover

THEOREM: “there is an $\leq$ k move solution to this cube”

Here is the idea.

"Random" config

Challenge (0 or 1)

Prover

Verifier

0: Show $k/2$ moves



Here is the idea.

"Random" config

Challenge (0 or 1)

Prover

Verifier

1: Show $k/2$ moves

POINT IS THIS: If the prover can do both consistently, then there exist k moves that map  to 

Interactive Proofs for a Language $\mathcal{L}$



Comp. Unbounded

Probabilistic
Polynomial-time

Interactive Proofs for a Language $\mathcal{L}$



Def: $\mathcal{L}$ is an $\mathcal{IP}$-language if there is a unbounded P and **probabilistic poly-time** verifier V where

- **Completeness**: If $x \in \mathcal{L}$, V always accepts.
- **Soundness:** If $x \notin \mathcal{L}$, regardless of the cheating prover strategy, V accepts with negligible probability.

Interactive Proofs for a Language $\mathcal{L}$



Def: $\mathcal{L}$ is an $\mathcal{IP}$-language if there is a **probabilistic poly-time** verifier V where

- **Completeness**: **If** $x \in \mathcal{L}$**,**

$$\Pr[(P, V)(x) = accept] = 1.$$

- **Soundness: If** $x \notin \mathcal{L}$**, there is a negligible function** negl **s.t. for every** P^***,**

$$\Pr[(P^*, V)(x) = accept] = \mathrm{negl}(\lambda).$$

Interactive Proofs for a Language $\mathcal{L}$



Def: $\mathcal{L}$ is an $\mathcal{IP}$-language if there is a **probabilistic poly-time** verifier V where

- **Completeness**: **If** $x \in \mathcal{L}$**,**

$$\Pr[(P, V)(x) = accept] \geq \boldsymbol{c}.$$

- **Soundness: If** $x \notin \mathcal{L}$**, there is a negligible function** negl **s.t. for every** $\boldsymbol{P}^*$**,**

$$\Pr[(P^*, V)(x) = accept] \leq \mathbf{s}.$$

Equivalent as long as $\boldsymbol{c} - \mathbf{s} \geq 1/\mathrm{poly}(\lambda)$

Interactive Proof for QR

$\mathcal{L} = \{(N, y): y \text{ is a quadratic residue mod } N\}$.



Completeness

Claim: If $(N, y) \in L$, then the verifier accepts the proof with probability 1.

Proof:

$$z^2 = (rx^b)^2 = r^2(x^2)^b = sy^b \pmod{N}$$

So, the verifier's check passes and he accepts.

Soundness

Claim: If $(N, y) \notin L$, then for every cheating prover P^*, the verifier accepts with probability at most 1/2.

Proof: Suppose the verifier accepts with probability > 1/2.

Then, there is some $s \in Z_N^*$ s.t. the prover produces

$$z_0 : z_0^2 = s \pmod N$$

$$z_1 : z_1^2 = sy \pmod N$$

This means $(z_1/z_0)^2 = y \pmod N$, which tells us that $(N, y) \in L$.

Interactive Proof for QR

$\mathcal{L} = \{(N, y): y \text{ is a quadratic residue mod } N\}$.

$s_i = r_i^2 \pmod N$

(N, y)

$b_i \leftarrow \{0,1\}$

(N, y)

If b_i=0: $z_i = r_i$

If b_i=1:$z_i = xr_i$

Check for all i:

$z_i^2 = s_i y^b \pmod N$

REPEAT sequentially λ times.

Soundness

Claim: If $(N, y) \notin L$, then for every cheating prover P^*, the verifier accepts with probability at most $(\frac{1}{2})^{\lambda}$.

Proof: Exercise.

This is Zero-Knowledge.

But what does that mean?

$s = r^2 \pmod N$

(N, y)

$b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$

(N, y)

If b=0: $z = r$

If b=1: $z = rx$

Check:
$z^2 = sy^b \pmod N$

How to Define Zero-Knowledge?

After the interaction, V knows:

- The theorem is true; and
- A **view** of the interaction
  (= transcript + coins of V)

P gives zero knowledge to V:

When the theorem is true, the view gives V nothing that he couldn't have obtained on his own without interacting with P.

How to Define Zero-Knowledge?

(P, V) is zero-knowledge if V can generate his **VIEW** of the interaction **all by himself** in **probabilistic polynomial time**.

How to Define Zero-Knowledge?

(P, V) is zero-knowledge if V can "simulate" his **VIEW** of the interaction **all by himself** in **probabilistic polynomial time**.

The Simulation Paradigm

sim_S:
(s, b, z)

PPT "simulator" S



(N, y)

$\boldsymbol{view_V(P, V)}$:
Transcript (s, b, z),
Coins = b

$s = r^2 \pmod N$

$b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$

(N, y)

If b=0: $z = r$

If b=1: $z = rx$

Check:
$z^2 = sy^b \pmod N$

Zero Knowledge: Definition

An Interactive Protocol (P,V) is zero-knowledge for a language L if there exists a **PPT** algorithm S (a simulator) such that **for every $x \in L$**, the following two distributions are indistinguishable:

1. $view_V(P, V)$

2. $S(x, 1^\lambda)$

(P,V) is a zero-knowledge interactive protocol if it is complete, sound and zero-knowledge.

Perfect Zero Knowledge: Definition

An Interactive Protocol (P,V) is **perfect zero-knowledge** for a language L if there exists a PPT algorithm S (a simulator) such that for every $x \in L$, the following two distributions are **identical**:

1. $view_V(P, V)$

2. $S(x, 1^\lambda)$

(P,V) is a zero-knowledge interactive protocol if it is complete, sound and zero-knowledge.

Statistical Zero Knowledge: Definition

An Interactive Protocol (P,V) is **statistical zero-knowledge** for a language L if there exists a PPT algorithm S (a simulator) such that for every $x \in L$, the following two distributions are **statistically indistinguishable**:

1. $view_V(P, V)$

2. $S(x, 1^\lambda)$

(P,V) is a zero-knowledge interactive protocol if it is complete, sound and zero-knowledge.

Computational Zero Knowledge: Definition

An Interactive Protocol (P,V) is **computational zero-knowledge** for a language L if there exists a PPT algorithm S (a simulator) such that for every $x \in L$, the following two distributions are **computationally indistinguishable**:

1. $view_V(P, V)$

2. $S(x, 1^\lambda)$

(P,V) is a zero-knowledge interactive protocol if it is complete, sound and zero-knowledge.

Zero Knowledge

Claim: The QR protocol is zero knowledge.



$view_V(P, V)$:
(s, b, z)

Simulator S works as follows:

1. First pick a random bit b.
2. pick a random $z \in Z_N^*$.
3. compute $s = z^2/y^b$.
4. output (s, b, z).

Exercise: The simulated transcript is identically distributed as the real transcript in the interaction (P,V).

What if V is NOT HONEST.

OLD DEF

An Interactive Protocol (P,V) is **honest-verifier** perfect zero-knowledge for a language L if there exists a PPT simulator S such that for every $x \in L$, the following two distributions are identical:

$$1.\ view_V(P,V) \qquad 2.\ S(x,1^\lambda)$$

REAL DEF

An Interactive Protocol (P,V) is **perfect zero-knowledge** for a language L if **for every PPT V^***, there exists a (expected) poly time simulator S s.t. for every $x \in L$, the following two distributions are identical:

$$1.\ view_{V^*}(P,V^*) \qquad 2.\ S(x,1^\lambda)$$

NOW: (Malicious Ver) Zero Knowledge

Theorem: The QR protocol is (malicious verifier) zero knowledge.



$view_{V^*}(P, V^*)$:
(s, b, z)

Simulator S works as follows:

1. First pick a random s and "feed it to" V^*.
2. Let b $= V^*(s)$.

Now what???

(Malicious Ver) Zero Knowledge

Theorem: The QR protocol is (malicious verifier) zero knowledge.

Simulator S works as follows:

1. First set $s = \frac{z^2}{y^b}$ for a random z and b and feed s to V^*.
2. Let $\mathrm{b}' = V^*(s)$.
3. If $b' = b$, output $(\mathrm{s}, \mathrm{b}, \mathrm{z})$ and stop.
4. Otherwise, go back to step 1 and repeat. (also called “rewinding”).

Simulator S works as follows:

1. First set $s = \frac{z^2}{y^b}$ for a random z and feed s to V^*.

2. Let $\mathrm{b}' = V^*(s)$.

3. If $b' = b$, output $(\mathrm{s}, \mathrm{b}, \mathrm{z})$ and stop.

4. Otherwise, go back to step 1 and repeat. (also called “rewinding”).

Lemma:

(1) S runs in expected polynomial-time.

(2) When S outputs a view, it is identically distributed to the view of V^* in a real execution.

What Made it Possible?

1. **Each statement had multiple proofs** of which the prover chooses one at random.

2. **Each such proof is made of two parts**: seeing either one on its own gives the verifier no knowledge; seeing both imply 100% correctness.

3. **Verifier chooses to see either part, at random**. The prover's ability to provide either part on demand convinces the verifier.