

**MIT 6.875**

**Foundations of Cryptography**  
**Lecture 7**

# Recap + Today

- ✓ Define one-way functions (OWF).
- ✓ Define Hardcore bits (HCB).
- ✓ Show that one-way functions\* + HCB  $\Rightarrow$  PRG

**Goldreich-Levin Theorem**: “every OWF has a HCB.”

# Recap + Today

- ✓ Define one-way functions (OWF).
- ✓ Define Hardcore bits (HCB).
- ✓ Show that one-way functions\* + HCB  $\Rightarrow$  PRG

**Goldreich-Levin Theorem**: for every OWF/OWP  $F$ , there is another OWF/OWP  $F'$  which has a HCB.

# Goldreich-Levin (GL) Theorem: Version 1

Let  $\{B_r: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}\}$  where

$$B_r(x) = \langle r, x \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^n r_i x_i \bmod 2$$

be a collection of predicates (one for each  $r$ ). Then, for **every** one-way function  $F$ , a **random**  $B_r$  is hardcore. That is, for every one-way function  $F$ , every PPT  $A$ , there is a negligible function  $\mu$  s.t.

$$\Pr[x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n; r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n: A(F(x), r) = B_r(x)] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mu(n)$$

# GL Theorem: Version 2

For *every* one-way function  $F$ , there is a related one-way function

$$F'(x, r) = (F(x), r)$$

which has a *deterministic* hardcore predicate. In particular, the predicate  $B(x, r) = \langle r, x \rangle \bmod 2$  is hardcore for  $F'$ .

$$\Pr[x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n; r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n: A(F'(x, r)) = \langle r, x \rangle] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mu(n)$$

## Key Point:

This statement is *sufficient* to construct PRGs from any OWP.

# If there are OWPs, then there are PRGs

## CONSTRUCTION

Let  $F$  be a one-way permutation, then  $G$  defined below is a PRG.

Then, define  $G(x, r) = F(x, r) \parallel \langle r, x \rangle = F(x) \parallel r \parallel \langle r, x \rangle$ .

**Theorem:**  $G$  is a PRG assuming  $F$  is a one-way permutation.

# We proved a weaker version in L6:

Let's assume a pretty good predictor  $P$


$$\Pr[x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n; r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n : P(F(x), r) = \langle r, x \rangle] \geq \frac{3}{4} + 1/p(n)$$

Then there is a OWF inverter  $A$ .

$$\Pr[x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n : A(F(x)) \in F^{-1}(F(x))] \geq 1/p'(n)$$

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$$\Pr[x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n; r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n: P(F(x), r) = \langle r, x \rangle] \geq \frac{3}{4} + 1/p(n)$$

First, we used an **averaging argument**.

Claim: For at least a  $1/2p(n)$  fraction of the  $x$ ,

$$\Pr[r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n: P(F(x), r) = \langle r, x \rangle] \geq \frac{3}{4} + 1/2p(n)$$

Call these **the good  $x$** .

Proof: On the board.



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$$\Pr[r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n: P(F(x), r) = \langle r, x \rangle] \geq \frac{3}{4} + 1/2p(n)$$

## Key Idea: Linearity

Pick a random  $r$  and ask  $P$  to tell us  $\langle r, x \rangle$  and  $\langle r + e_i, x \rangle$ .  
Subtract the two answers to get  $\langle e_i, x \rangle = x_i$ .

Proof:  $\Pr[\text{we compute } x_i \text{ correctly}]$

$$\begin{aligned} &\geq \Pr[P \text{ predicts } \langle r, x \rangle \text{ and } \langle r + e_i, x \rangle \text{ correctly}] \\ &= 1 - \Pr[P \text{ predicts } \langle r, x \rangle \text{ or } \langle r + e_i, x \rangle \text{ wrong}] \\ &\geq 1 - (\Pr[P \text{ predicts } \langle r, x \rangle \text{ wrong}] + \\ &\quad \Pr[P \text{ predicts } \langle r + e_i, x \rangle \text{ wrong}]) \quad (\text{by union bound}) \\ &\geq 1 - 2 \cdot \left( \frac{1}{4} - \frac{1}{2p(n)} \right) = \frac{1}{2} + 1/p(n) \end{aligned}$$

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## Inverter A:

Repeat for each  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ :

Repeat  $O(\log n (p(n))^2)$  times:

Pick a random  $r$  and ask  $P$  to tell us  $\langle r, x \rangle$  and  $\langle r + e_i, x \rangle$ .  
Subtract the two answers to get a guess for  $x_i$ .

Compute the majority of all such guesses and set the bit as  $x_i$

Output the concatenation of all  $x_i$  as  $x$ .

## Analysis: Chernoff + Union Bound

# Who's the culprit here?

For at least a  $1/2p(n)$  fraction of the  $x$ ,

$$\Pr[r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n: P(F(x), r) = \langle r, x \rangle] \geq \frac{3}{4} + 1/2p(n)$$

Pick a random  $r$  and ask  $P$  to tell us  $\langle r, x \rangle$  and  $\langle r + e_i, x \rangle$ .  
Subtract the two answers to get  $\langle e_i, x \rangle = x_i$ .

Proof:  $\Pr[\text{we compute } x_i \text{ correctly}]$

$$\geq \Pr[P \text{ predicts } \langle r, x \rangle \text{ and } \langle r + e_i, x \rangle \text{ correctly}]$$

$$= 1 - \Pr[P \text{ predicts } \langle r, x \rangle \text{ or } \langle r + e_i, x \rangle \text{ wrong}]$$

$$\geq 1 - (\Pr[P \text{ predicts } \langle r, x \rangle \text{ wrong}] + \Pr[P \text{ predicts } \langle r + e_i, x \rangle \text{ wrong}]) \text{ (by union bound)}$$


$$\geq 1 - 2 \cdot \left( \frac{1}{4} - \frac{1}{2p(n)} \right) = \frac{1}{2} + 1/p(n)$$

# The Real Proof of the GL Theorem

(attributed to Charlie Rackoff)

Assume (after averaging) that for  $\geq 1/2p(n)$  f

$$\Pr[r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n: P(F(x), r) = \langle r, x \rangle] \geq \frac{1}{2} + 1/$$



For a minute, assume we have a bit of help/ad

Pick a random  $r$ , ask the Oracle to tells us  $\langle r, x \rangle$  and ask  $P$  to tell us  $\langle r + e_i, x \rangle$ . Subtract the two answers to get  $\langle e_i, x \rangle = x_i$ .

Proof:  $\Pr$ [we compute  $x_i$  correctly]

$$\geq \Pr[P \text{ predicts } \langle r + e_i, x \rangle \text{ correctly}] \geq \frac{1}{2} + 1/2p(n)$$



# The Real Proof of the GL Theorem

Assume (after averaging) that for  $\geq 1/2p(n)$  f

$$\Pr[r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n: P(F(x), r) = \langle r, x \rangle] \geq \frac{1}{2} + 1/$$



Pick a random  $r$ , **guess**  $\langle r, x \rangle$  and ask  $P$  to tell us  $\langle r + e_i, x \rangle$ .  
Subtract the two to get  $\langle e_i, x \rangle = x_i$ .

If our guesses are all correct, then the analysis works out just as before.

But what's the chance...?

The number of  $r$ 's is  $m = O(n \log n (p(n))^2)$ .

# Parsimony in Guessing

Pick random “seed vectors”  $s_1, \dots, s_{\log(m+1)}$ , and **guess**  $c_j = \langle s_j, x \rangle$  for all  $j$ .

The probability that all guesses are correct is  $\frac{1}{2^{\log(m+1)}} = 1/(m+1)$  which is not bad.

**From the seed vectors, generate many more  $r_i$ .**

Let  $T_1, \dots, T_m$  denote all possible non-empty subsets of  $\{1, 2, \dots, \log(m+1)\}$ . We will let

$$r_i = \bigoplus_{j \in T_i} s_j \quad \text{and} \quad b_i = \bigoplus_{j \in T_i} c_j$$

**Key Observation:** If the guesses  $c_1, \dots, c_{\log(m+1)}$  are all correct, then so are the  $b_1, \dots, b_m$ .

# The OWF Inverter

Generate random  $s_1, \dots, s_{\log(m+1)}$  and bits  $c_1, \dots, c_{\log(m+1)}$ .

From them, derive  $r_1, \dots, r_{\log(m+1)}$  and bits  $b_1, \dots, b_m$  as in the previous slide.

Repeat for each  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ :

Repeat  **$100n(p(n))^2$**  times:

Ask  $P$  to tell us  $\langle r_i + e_i, x \rangle$ . XOR  $P$ 's reply with  $b_i$  to get a guess for  $x_i$ .

Compute the majority of all such guesses and set the bit as  $x_i$

Output the concatenation of all  $x_i$  as  $x$ .

# Analysis of the Inverter

Let's condition on the guesses  $c_1, \dots, c_{\log(m+1)}$  being all correct.

**The main issue:** The  $r_i$  are not independent (can't do Chernoff)

**Key Observation:** The  $r_i$  **are** pairwise independent.

Therefore, can apply Chebyshev!

**We have** that

$p := \Pr[\text{Inverter succeeds} \mid \text{all guesses correct, good } x] \geq 0.99.$

(Pf. on the board, also in the next two slides)



# Putting it all together

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[\text{Inverter succeeds}] \\ & \geq \Pr[\text{Inverter succeeds} \mid \text{all guesses correct, good } x] \cdot \\ & \quad \Pr[\text{all guesses correct}] \cdot \Pr[\text{good } x] \\ & = \frac{1}{m+1} \cdot \frac{1}{2p(n)} \cdot p \\ & = \frac{1}{2n^2p(n)^3} \cdot p \end{aligned}$$

So, it suffices to show that  $p$  is large.

By our calculation (on the board),  $p \geq 0.99$ , so we are done. 

Can also make the success probability  $\approx 1/p(n)$  by enumerating over all the “guesses”. Each guess results in a supposed inverse, but we can check which of them is the actual inverse!

# The Coding-Theoretic View of GL

$x \rightarrow (\langle x, r \rangle)_{r \in \{0,1\}^n}$  can be viewed as a highly redundant, exponentially long encoding of  $x$  = **the Hadamard code**.

$P(F(x), r)$  can be thought of as providing access to a **noisy** codeword.

What we proved:

- **unique decoding** algorithm for Hadamard code with error rate  $\frac{1}{4} - 1/p(n)$ .
- **list-decoding algorithm** for Hadamard code with error rate  $\frac{1}{2} - 1/p(n)$ .

# Hardcore Predicates from any List-Decodable Code

(due to Impagliazzo and Sudan)

$x \rightarrow C(x)$  is the encoding.

Given a  $C(x)$  that is incorrect at  $\frac{1}{2} - \varepsilon$  fraction of the locations, a list-decoder outputs a list  $\{x_1, \dots, x_m\}$  of possibilities for  $x$ .

The hardcore predicate is

$$B_i(x) = C(x)_i.$$

A hardcore-bit predictor gives us access to a corrupted codeword. Running the list-decoder on it gives us the list of possible inverses. The fact that the OWF is easy to compute means that we can filter out the bogus (non-)inverses.

# Recap

1. Defined one-way functions (OWF).
2. Defined Hardcore bits (HCB).
3. Goldreich-Levin Theorem: every OWF has a HCB.  
*(showed proof for an important special case)*
4. Show that one-way *permutations* (OWP)  $\Rightarrow$  PRG  
*(in fact, one-way functions  $\Rightarrow$  PRG, but that's a much harder theorem)*

# Universal Hardcore Predicate Conjecture 1

For every one-way function  $F$ ,  
**there exists** a circuit  $B_F$  s.t.  
for every PPT Circuit/Turing Machine  $A$ ,  
there is a negligible function  $\mu$  s.t.

$$\Pr[x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n : A(F(x)) = B_F(x)] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mu(n)$$

In fact: I conjecture that for every one-way function  $F$ , there **exists** an  $r_F$  for which the predicate  $B_{r_F}(x) = \langle r_F, x \rangle$  that is hardcore.



# Universal Hardcore Predicate Conjecture 2

For every one-way function  $F$ ,  
there is **an efficiently generatable** circuit  $B_F$  s.t.  
for every PPT Circuit/Turing Machine  $A$ ,  
there is a negligible function  $\mu$  s.t.

$$\Pr[x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n : A(F(x)) = B_F(x)] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mu(n)$$




# Other Topics (Time permitting)

1. OWF  $\Rightarrow$  PRG?

2. Pseudorandom Permutations from  
Pseudorandom Functions  
(the Luby-Rackoff construction)

# Minicrypt:



Candidate Constructions: from number theory, geometry, combinatorics,...