The Evolution of Proofs in Computer Science and the Existence of SNARGs

Lecture 17

$$M, x \qquad \qquad y \\ M(x) = y \\ (x) = y \\$$

Completeness: If M(x) = y within time T, then a valid certificate for y = M(x) is computable in time $\approx T$, of size $\ll T$, and verifiable in time $\ll T$.

Soundness: If $M(x) \neq y$ then it is "practically impossible" to generate a valid certificate.

If adv succeeds then it can break a cryptographic assumption

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Succinct Non-interactive Argument (SNARG)

What is a Proof?



Thales (600BCE)





Hilbert (19th century)

Zero-Knowledge Proofs [Goldwasser-Micali-Rackoff85]

Proofs that reveal **no information** beyond the validity of the statement



Interactive Proofs [Goldwasser-Micali-Rackoff85]



Completeness: P can convince V to accept a true statement with probability 1 (over V's coin tosses)

Soundness: A prover cannot convince V to accept a false statement except with exponentially small probability (over V's coin tosses)

Interactive Proofs [Goldwasser-Micali-Rackoff85]



Theorem [Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson87]: Every statement that has a classical proof has zero-knowledge interactive proof, assuming one-way functions exist.

Interactive Proofs are Shorter!

[Lund-Fortnow-Karloff-Nissan90, Shamir90]

Example: Chess



proof

Classical

Interactive Proofs are Shorter! [Lund-Fortnow-Karloff-Nissan90, Shamir90]

Example: Chess



Succinct

Theorem: *IP* = *PSPACE* verification time ≈ space [BenOr-Goldwasser-Kilian-Wigderson]: **Do there exist ZK proofs unconditionally?**(Without assuming one-way functions)

Not in general!

Unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses

Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs [BenOr-Goldwasser-Kilian-Wigderson88]



Completeness: P_1 and P_2 can convince V to accept a true statement with probability 1 (over V's coin tosses)

Soundness: Non-communicating provers cannot convince V to accept a false statement, except with exponentially small probability (over V's coin tosses)

Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs [BenOr-Goldwasser-Kilian-Wigderson88]



Theorem: Every statement that has a proof has an **unconditional zero-knowledge** proof!

Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs [BenOr-Goldwasser-Kilian-Wigderson88]



Theorem [Babai-Fortnow-Lund90]: Any proof can be made exponentially shorter with a 2-prover interactive proof!

[Fortnow-Rompel-Sipser88]:



Probabilistically Checkable Proofs



Probabilistically Checkable Proofs



[Feige-Goldwasser-Lovasz-Safra-Szegedy91, Babai-Fortnow-Levin-Szegedy91, Arora-Safra92, Arora-Lund-Mutwani-Sudan-Szegedy92]

PCP Theorem:

Every proof can be converted to a probabilistically checkable one (of almost same size) that can be verified by reading only constant number of its bits.



Fast Forward to Today's Reality



Fast Forward to Today's Reality



Succinct Non-Interactive Argument (SNARG)



Succinct Proofs

A succinct proof that my transaction is valid!







A doubly efficient Interactive proof for proving correctness of a computation satisfies:

Prover runtime ≈ computation runtime

Verifier runtime ≈ |input|

Focus: Polynomial-time computations!

Doubly Efficient Interactive Proofs

[Goldwasser-K-Rothblum08]:

Doubly efficient interactive proofs for **depth bounded** computations (communication complexity grows with the **depth**)

[Reingold-Rothblum-Rothblum15]:

Doubly efficient interactive proofs for space bounded computations (communication complexity grows with the space, and with time ϵ small const.)

Non-Interactive Delegation scheme for all functions!

[Kilian92, Micali94]

Non-Interactive Delegation scheme for all functions!

[Kilian92, Micali94]

Relax soundness to hold only against polynomial time adversaries

Interactive Proofs [Goldwasser-Micali-Rackoff85]



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Succinct Interactive Arguments [Kilian92, Micali94]

Convert any PCP into a succinct interactive argument



Theorem: This scheme is **sound** against cheating provers that **cannot find collisions in** *H* (i.e., cannot find $x_1 \neq x_2$ such that $H(x_1) = H(x_2)$)



Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments (SNARGs)

Common random string (CRS)

Guarantee: Given CRS, it is computationally hard to generate a proof of a false statement

Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments (SNARGs)

Apply Fiat-Shamir Paradigm to eliminate interaction from interactive schemes

From Succinct Interactive Schemes to SNARGs



The (In)Security of the Fiat-Shamir Heuristic [FS86]

Proposed as a heuristic for converting identification schemes into signature schemes.



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From Theory to Practice



From Theory to Deployment









ethereum





Securing Information for Encrypted Verification and Evaluation (SIEVE)





